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RECENT CASES
Bankruptcy--Right of Corporations Having Publicly Owned Secu-
rities to Effect an Arrangement Under Chapter XI-Defendant, having
7000 shareholders, filed a petition under Chapter XI 1 to extend the matu-
rity of debenture bonds of a subsidiary, which bonds it had guaranteed.
SEC intervened, claiming that a Chapter X 2 proceeding was necessary,
because this defendant had publicly owned securities. Defendant said XI
provided for an extension, adjustment or accommodation of unsecured
claims by any debtor, without disturbance of either secured claims or stock
interests, and furthermore that XI made no provision for intervention or
control by SEC. Held (three justices dissenting), petition dismissed. The
feasibility of this proposed plan, which eliminated rights of creditors with-
out affecting shareholders, could not be adjudged in XI, for more adequate
determination was available under X, since the SEC could there afford
protection to the public; and the SEC could intervene in XI to force pro-
ceedings in X. Securities & Exchange Commission v. United States Realty
& Improvement Co., 6o Sup. Ct. lo44 (194o).3
In attempting to determine the dividing line that separates the right
of a corporation to rehabilitation under XI and to reorganization under
X,4 this decision makes the existence of publicly owned securities the
test. This result is designed to enforce the majority's interpretation of
the legislative intent existent when this statute was enacted, and to per-
mit the use of administrative and judicial safeguards afforded by X for
the public's protection.5  However, while the result is laudable, the legal
reasoning of the majority appears strained. Realizing that proceedings
cannot be commenced under X unless XI is inadequate,6 reliance is placed
upon the fact that a plan of arrangement under XI cannot be approved
unless it is "fair, equitable and feasible". These words are interpreted,
as they were under equity receiverships 7 and Section 7719,8 to mean that
the creditors' rights cannot be eliminated without a disturbance of share-
I. CHANDLER Acr OF 1938, 52 STAT. 9os, 11 U. S. C. A. § 701 (1939). This chap-
ter on arrangements is discussed by Mulder and Solomon, Effect of the Chandler Act
Upon General Assignments and Compositions (1939) 87 U. OF PA. L. Ray. 763. See
also Gerdes, General Principles of Plans of Corporate Reorganization (194o) 89 U. OF
PA. L. Rzv. 39.
2. 52 STAT. 883, 1I U. S. C. A. § 5oi (939).
3.-This reversed the decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals. In re United States
Realty & Improvement Co., io8 F. (2d) 794 (C. C. A. 2d, i94O), 88 U. OF PA. L. REv.
873, 53 HARv. L. REV. io5-IO58.
4. Prior to this decision, this problem was the fruit of much conjecture. See 13 J.
N. A. REF. BANKR. (1939) 72; Gerdes, Corporate Reorganizations: Changes Effected
by Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act (1938) 52 HARv. L. REV. I; Heuston, Corporate
Reorganizations under the Chandler Act (1938) 38 CoL. L. REv. 1199; Rostow and
Cutler, Competing Systems of Corporate Reorganization: Chapters X and XI of the
Bankruptcy Act (i939) 48 YALE L. J. 1334.
5. Dodd, The Securities and Exchange Commisrsion's Reform Program for Bank-
ruptcy Reorganizations (1938) 38 CoL. L. REv. 723; Mulder, Ambiguities in the
Chandler Act (1940) 89 U. OF PA. L. REv. io. These safeguards are not thought of too
highly by Swaine, "Democratization' of Corporate Reorganizations (938) 38 COL. L.
REV. 256.
6. Rostow and Cutler, supra note 4, at 1362.
7. Northern Pacific Ry. v. Boyd, 228 U. S. 482 (1913). See FINLaTrER, THE
LAW OF BANKRUPTCY REORGANIZATION (1939) 35.
8. Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 308 U. S. io6 (939). A plan had
to be feasible under § 77B or it would be summarily dismissed. Tennessee Publishing
Co. v. American National Bank, 299 U. S. 18 (1936).
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holders' rights, unless there be some compensatory advantage to the cred-
itors. Then, even though jurisdiction within the terms of Chapter XI
does exist, the majority, relying upon the broad equitable powers of a
bankruptcy court," dismissed the petition, since more adequate relief is
available under X where the SEC can determine the equity of the proposed
plan. Since XI made no provision for alteration of shareholders' rights, it
is difficult to assume that "fair, equitable, feasible" were meant to have their
previous connotation, for, under the present interpretation, since there exists
no standard of how "publicly owned" the securities must be,10 XI is, in
effect, reduced to a nullity for any but small corporations.1 Therefore, it
seems that these words should be interpreted in the light of XI alone, and
that "the best interests of the creditors", another requirement before a
petition under XI can be approved, should be controlling. Thus, a plan, as
here, should not be regarded as inequitable prima facie; rather, if the cred-
itors are securing as much as they can at a proposed liquidation,1 2 the plan
should be held feasible. Of course, it is true that a contra policy would
permit circumvention by corporations of the administrative safeguards and
supervision by the SEC. Yet, since the determination of the congressional
intent is difficult,' the minority's view being contra the majority's, and
since the plain language of the act seems to permit any debtor to attempt
an arrangement of unsecured debts, the cure rests with .legislative action, not
with judicial interpretation." A possible solution would have been to
permit intervention by the SEC, not only specially, as was allowed, but
generally, so as to shift the burden of proof upon the corporation to show
the plan is fair, in the best interests of the creditors, and not designed to
outlaw the provisions of X. Intervention and the right to appeal to enforce
this procedure would be permitted under the majority's interpretation of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 5 and furthermore, this would afford
no new substantive right, only a protection of the SEC's existing rights.
Constitutional Law-Constitutionality of State Law Regulating
Pawnbrokers-Plaintiff pawnbrokers sought to have declared uncon-
stitutional the Pawnbrokers License Act,' which regulated their business by
establishing maximum interest rates and service charges, upon the ground
9. ". . . technical considerations will not prevent substantial justice from being
done." Pepper v. Litton, 308 U. S. 295, 305 (1939) ; Wayne United Gas Co. v. Owens-
Illinois Glass Co., 300 U. S. 31 (937). A court of bankruptcy as a court of equity
is "bound to stay its hand in the public interest where it reasonably appears that the
private right will not suffer." Pennsylvania v. Williams, 294 U. S. 176, 185 (i935).
io. "A bill to establish this dividing line was introduced at the present session of
Congress by Mr. McLaughlin, [but has been] pigeonholed for the present session."
Montgomery, Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act, Address before the American Bar
Association, Philadelphia, Penna., Sept. 9, i94o (to be printed in AmERIcAN BAR Ass'N
JouR.).
ii. The majority decision attempts to illustrate situations in which the chapter will
still be available to corporations. See pp. I052-io53. An excellent suggestion to de-
termine when XI may be used is contained in Rostow and Cutler, supra note 4, at 136o.
12. Montgomery, su pra note IO, at 25.
13. Mulder, supra note 5, at 19.
14. "At best this is subtle business, calling for great wariness lest what professes to
be mere rendering becomes creation and attempted interpretation of legislation becomes
legislation itself." Palmer v. Massachusetts, 3o8 U. S. 79, 83 (1939). See Montgom-
ery, supra note io, at 23. 24.
I5. See 2 MooRr, FEDERAL PRACtiCE (1938) §§ 24.O9, 24.i0, and instant case at 1055.
i. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1939) tit. 63, § 281-I et seq., noted at (194o) 89
U. OF PA. L. Ray. iO4,
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that the regulations were in effect confiscatory. 2 Held (two justices dis-
senting),3 the confiscatory nature of the rates is immaterial, since the legis-
lature having the power to prohibit pawnbroking entirely, could enact
regulations falling short of complete suppression. Equitable Loan Society v.
Bell, 14 A. (2d) 316 (Pa. i94o).
It is well settled that a private, legitimate business may operate free
from close supervision by the state.* However, enterprises so inherently
dangerous to public welfare may be entirely prohibited.5  Between these
two extremes are businesses not inherently harmful and yet "affected with
the public interest" which may be subjected to reasonable regulation and
supervision under the state's police power.6 The courts almost without
exception have considered pawnbroking a legitimate enterprise, but have
permitted the legislature to exercise reasonable regulatory control.7  The
instant case is unique in flatly holding that pawnbroking is so inherently
inimical to public welfare that it may be completely forbidden by the state.'
2. Another interesting and important point of this case, not dealt with in this dis-
cussion, was the plaintiff's objection to the delegation to the Secretary of Banking of
complete discretionary power to reject any application for a license to conduct a pawn-
broking establishment as provided in PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1939) tit. 63,
§ 281-8.
3. Five separate opinions were written. Drew, J., wrote the majority opinion.
Linn, I., separately concurred in the decision of the majority in favor of the defendants,
but on the ground that the plaintiff had erred in their method of procedure. Schaffer,
C. I., seemed also to join with the decision of the majority but wrote a supplemental
opinion maintaining that pawnbroking being a lawful business could not be prohibited
under the Constitution of the United States, but could be subjected to reasonable regu-
lation. The peculiar conglomeration of opinions constituting the majority should be
particularly noted I
Stem, J., dissented and Patterson, J., concurred in that part of the dissenting opin-
ion which denied the right of the state to suppress entirely the pawnbroking business.
4. U. S. CoNsT. Amend. XIV, § i: ". . . nor shall any State deprive any per-
son of life, liberty or property, without due process of law; . . .". See Dasch v.
Jackson, 170 Md. 251, 263, 183 Atl. 534, 539 (1936) (regulation of paperhangers);
Lawrence v. Board of Registration in Medicine, 239 Mass. 424, 428, 132 N. E. 174, 176
(19r2) (regulation of physicians).
5. Diverse illustrations of inherently dangerous or harmful occupations: sale of
trading stamps: Rast v. Van Deman and Lewis Co., 24o U. S. 342 (1926); sale of
drugs by itinerant vendors: Baccus v. Louisiana, 232 U. S. 334 (94); sale of malt
liquors: Purity Extract and Tonic Co. v. Lynch, 226 U. S. x92 (1912); billiard hall
establishments: Murphy v. California, 225 U. S. 623 (i912); sale of stocks on mar-
gin: Otis v. Parker, 187 U. S. 6o6 (i9o3) ; sale of futures in grain or other commodi-
ties: Booth v. Illinois, 184 U. S. 425 (1902) ; sale of cigarettes: Austin v. Tennessee,
179 U.'S. 343 (igoo) ; sale and manufacture of oleomargarine: Powell v. Pennsylvania,
127 U. S. 678 (i888) ; sale and manufacture of liquor: Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S.
623 (1857) ; sale of specially skimmed milk: Carolene Products Co. v. Harter, 329 Pa.
49, 197 At. 627 (1938); peddling: Commonwealth v. Brinton, 132 Pa. 69, 18 Atd. io92
(189o). But cf. Fairmont Creamery Co. v. Minnesota, 274 U. S. I (1927); Weaver
v. Palmer Brothers Co., 270 U. S. 402 (1926) ; Adams v. Tanner, 224 U. S. 590 (917).
6. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 52 (i934); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113
(z876).
7. Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U. S. 332 (1924) ; Shuman v. Ft. Wayne, 127
Ind. 109, 26 N. E. 56o (189i); City of Butte v. Paltrovich, 30 Mont. i8, 75 Pac.
521 (1904) ; COOLEY, CONSTUTIONAL LiTrATIONs (7th ed. 1903) 888.
In Wood v. Krepps, 168 Cal. 382, 387, 143 Pac. 691, 693 (1924), the court said,
"There is no law in this state making the business of loaning money on personal prop-
erty illegal. It is a legitimate branch of commercial business. ..... But see St.
Louis v. Baskowitz, 273 Mo. 563, 577, 202 S. W. 870, 88o (I918) ; St. Joseph v. Levin,
128 Mo. 588, 594, 31 S. W. 10, 102 (1895) ; Adinolfi v. Hazlett, 242 Pa. 25, 29, 88 Atl.
86s, 871 (913) ; Foster's Application, 23 Pa. Dist. 558, 559 (94).
8. Instant case at 318, "But even if confiscation had been shown it would have made
no difference, because the Commonwealth under its police power can prohibit the pawn-
broking business entirely." Actually though, the court did hold, at 318, "... plain-
tiff failed to prove that the rates proposed are confiscatory."
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Of paramount significance, moreover, is the next step of the court in con-
cluding that since the legislature may absolutely prohibit the pawnbroker
from operating, a fortiori it may, while permitting him to transact business,
at the same time deny him the right to earn any profit on his transactions.
Merely because a state may forbid certain conduct, it does not necessarily
follow that the state may permit the conduct on any condition it so wishes.9
In permitting a pawnbroker to operate, thereby impliedly, if not expressly
sanctioning his enterprise, it would seem that a state legislature must at the
same time appreciate the legal privileges attached to the authorized pursuit,
one of those privileges being the right to earn a reasonable profit.' 0 Fur-
thermore, the state itself adopted solely a policy of regulation and not one
of suppression." The court, in tacitly sanctioning complete prohibition of
pawnbroking, went much further than even the legislative recommendations
and enactment contemplated. In view of the absence of any investigations
or considerations by the legislature concerning this latter policy, such a
judicial holding seems of questionable desirability.'
2
Constitutional Law-Divestiture of Lien under Subsequent Tax
Sale Statute-Plaintiff municipality petitioned, under a state statute,"
for an order to sell certain real property for taxes, clear of liens, alleging
that at a previous, regularly held sheriff's sale there had been no bidder at
the upset price.2 Mortgagee answered that the statute, passed subsequent
to the recording of his mortgage, was unconstitutional as impairing the
obligation of contracts 3 when applied retroactively to divest his lien. Held'
9. Frost and Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Commission of California, 271 U. S.
583, 593 (1926) : "It is not necessary to challenge the proposition that, as a general
rule, the state, having power to deny a privilege altogether, may grant it upon such
conditions as it sees fit to impose. But the power of the state in that respect is not un-
limited; and one of the limitations is that it may not impose conditions which require
the relinquishment of constitutional rights. If the state may compel the surrender of
one constitutional right as a condition of its favor, it may, in like manner, compel a
surrender of all. It is inconceivable that guaranties embedded in the Constitution of
the United States may thus be manipulated out of existence."
io. The application of this principle under other factual circumstances may be seen
in Frost and Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Commission of California, 271 U. S. 583
(I926), cited note 9 supra; Terral v. Burke Construction Co., 257 U. S. 529 (1922).
ii. Rep. Dept. Banking (1937) Small Loan Companies, 29.
12. An interesting possibility should be noted whereby a pawnbroker might be able
to charge higher rates by applying for registration under the Consumer Discount Com-
pany Act, PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1939) tit. 7, § 761-I et seq.
i. Act of May I6, 1923, PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1931) tit. 53, § 2051. The stat-
ute provided that where property put up for sale by the sheriff to satisfy a tax judg-
ment cannot be sold for a sum sufficient to pay all taxes and municipal claims, the
municipality may postpone the sale, and upon proper notice to all interested parties,
petition the court for a decree to have the land sold at a regular sheriff's sale free and
clear of all liens, subject only to the right of redemption.
2. A sum sufficient to pay all taxes and municipal claims in full. Act of May I6,
3923, PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, i93i) tit. 53, § 2049.
3. U. S. CoNsT. Art. I, § io.
4. Adjudicated, although hardly discussed, was the divestiture of prior mortgage
liens by sheriff's sale, which was allowed under the procedure provided by § 31 of the
Act of May I6, x923, cited note I supra, even where no lien prior to that of the mort-
gage is divested. This holding is adequately supported by the unequivocal words of
the statute itself, as well as by the judicial interpretation it has received in numerous
dicta and in lower court decisions. Justice Kephart, in Gordon v. Harrisburg, 334 Pa.
70, 72, 17i AtI. 277 (1934), said: "A second sale of the premises by the sheriff may be
had with proper notice to interested parties, whereby 'an absolute title to the property
sold [may be acquired], free, and discharged of all tax and municipal claims, liens,
mortgages . . .'." In Dry Dock Ass'n v. Georeno, io6 Pa. Super. 505, 510, 363 Atl.
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(one judge dissenting '), the statute was not invalid since the mortgagee's
contract with his debtor was subject to the implied condition that the land
would continue to be taxed and that such taxes must be paid out of the
land. City of Erie v. A Piece of Land, etc., 14 A. (2d) 428 (Pa. 194o).
While attempts of legislatures to give certain classes of liens 6 priority
and to extend mortgage redemption periods 7 have consistently been de-
clared unconstitutional as impairing the obligation of contracts when applied
retroactively to interests recorded prior to the passage of the statutes, yet
the courts have not hesitated to validate 8 the same 9 provisions when made
as an exercise of the police powers.10 By analogy to the latter situation 1
it would seem that the power of the state to tax 2 should also be held outside
the scope of the "contracts clause". The cases have so held, and tax liens
have been allowed priority over mortgage liens which antedated the stat-
utes.'8 The reasoning of the courts has been based on the concept of the
382, 383 (1932), the court said: "We may also call attention to the fact that the latter
part of § 31 expressly provides that where the property is not sold for a sum sufficient
to pay all taxes and municipal claims the plaintiff may in the manner set out in the act,
postpone the sale, and sell the property clear of all liens." In School District v. Mc-
Clane Mining Co., 85 Pitts. L. J. 125 (1937), the court granted the petition of plaintiff
to sell the property of defendant clear of all liens, under the Act of 1923. See also City
of Uniontown v. McGibbons, 1I5 Pa. Super. 132, 136, 174 Atl. 912, 913 (1934). That
the Act of April 3o, 1929, PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, i93o) tit. 21, § 651, which pro-
vides that the lien of a mortgage should not be divested by a tax sale, did not repeal
§ 31 of the Act of May 16, 1923, see Gordon v. Harrisburg, supra at 75, 171 At. at ?79
(by implication), and School District v. McClane Mining Co., supra, in which the
court said: "The statute [of 1923] . . . is a particular enabling act . . . the Act
of 1929, invoked by respondent as a repealer of the Act of 1923, is general legislation
for the divestiture of liens. In the absence of express words of repeal it cannot affect
a previous particular statute."
5. Justice Maxey, in the dissenting opinion, raises the interesting question of
whether the Act of 1923 purported to be retroactive and cover the factual situation of
the instant case.
6. Crowther v. Fidelity Ins. Trust & Safe Deposit Co., 85 Fed. 41 (C. C. A. 4 th,
1898) (mining supplies' lien); Central Savings Bank of N. Y., 279 N. Y. 266, IS N. E.
(2d) 151 (1938) (lien for tenement alterations) ; National Bank of Commerce v. Jones,
I8 Okla. 555, 91 Pac. I91 (19o7) (agister's lien).
7. W. B. Worthen Co. v. Kavanaugh, 295 U. S. 56 (1935); Barnitz v. Beverly,
163 U. S. 118 (i8g6).
8. Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 29o U. S. 398 (1934) (mortgage
moratorium laws).
9. Compare Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398 (1934), cited
note 8 supra, with Barnitz v. Beverly, 163 U. S. 118 (I896), cited note 7 supra. Note
attempt of court in Blaisdell case at 433 to distinguish the Barnitz case on its facts.
io.: "It is the settled law of this court that the interdiction of statutes impairing the
obligation of contracts does not prevent the State from exercising such powers as are
vested in it for the promotion of the common weal, or are necessary for the general
good of the public, though contracts previously entered into between individuals may
thereby be affected. . . . the police power . . . is paramount to any rights under
contracts between individuals." Manigault v. Springs, 199 U. S. 473, 48o (i9o5) (erec-
tion of a dam and drainage of a stream by a local government). BLACK, CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW ( 4th ed. 1927) § 279 at 726. See (1939) 87 U. OF PA. L. REv. 613.
ii. See Brief of Appellant, p. 12, Erie v. A Piece of Land, etc., 14 A. (2d) 428
(Pa. 1940).
12. The cases have divided sharply in practice, if not in terminology, between con-
tracts between the taxing body itself and some third party regarding tax exemptions
(See (1940) 88 U. OF PA. L. Ray. 1013) and contracts between two third parties which
are subsequently affected by taxing provisions of the State. Only the latter situation
is here discussed.
13. People of Puerto Rico v. Fed. Land Bank of Baltimore, io8 F. (2d) 275 (C.
C. A. ist, 1939); German Savings and Loan Soc. v. Ramish, 138 Cal. 12o, 69 Pac. 89
(192) ; Gailey v. Robertson, 98 Fla. 176, r23 So. 692 (1929) ; Atlanta Trust Co. v.
Atlanta Realty Corp., 177 Ga. 58I, 170 S. E. 791 (933) ; Baldwin v. Moroney, 173
Ind. 574, g N. E. 3 (igio) ; Lydecker v. Palisade Land Co., 33 N. J. Eq. 415 (1881);
State v. Wynne, 134 Tex. 455, 133 S. W. (2d) 951 (939).
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sovereignty of the state as regards taxation,14 as well as on the theory that
the owner of the fee holds his title subject to the paramount right of the
public, and the lienor takes his mortgage with notice of that paramount
right.'15 More impressive is the approach of Justice Holmes which discards
the question of notice as a fallacious attempt to liken collection of taxes to
the enforcement by an individual of a private lien.'" The mortgagee's
interest was always subject to the paramount taxing power 17 and together
with that of the mortgagor must yield to lawful taxation.18 Contrary
authority would seem weak in that it is in turn based upon cases 19 of
impairment of contract rights by statute where neither police power nor
taxation was involved.20 Practically speaking, taxes are not collectable from
property mortgaged above its market value when a tax sale must be subject
to recorded liens. To remedy this situation 2' the legislation in question
provided for divestiture of liens when the regular tax sale procedure had
proved unavailing.22 Unpaid taxes must be recovered from the land taxed 2 8
and a mortgagee should not be allowed to defeat the only workable pro-
cedure for so doing because his private interest in the land preceded the
enactment of the method of tax collection.
2 4
Insurance-Liability for Loss When Delay Has Prevented Ac-
ceptance of Application-Plaintiff's intestate applied for a life insur-
ance policy with the defendant company and paid the first premium. Appli-
cant was killed two months later, before either acceptance or rejection by
the defendant. His administrator sues on the theory that the defendant
was negligent in failing to act promptly. Held, that the insurance company
is not liable, for it has no duty to act promptly on an application. Zayc v.
14. Lydecker v. Palisade Land Co., 33 N. J. Eq. 415, 416 (1881). For a strong
criticism of this argument see Merrill, Application of the Obligation of Contract Clause
to State Promises in 2 SLEcrm- EssAYs ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1938) 319, 321.
Limitations imposed on retroactive taxation (See Note (1939) 27 GEo. L. J. 958) also
indicate the weakness of this position.
15. Murphy v. Beard, 138 Ind. 56o, !65, 38-N. E. 33, 34 (1894).
I6. Seattle v. Kelleher, 195 U. S. 351, 360 (19o4).
17. Baldwin v. Moroney, 173 Ind. 574, 583, 9I N. E. 3, 7 (910).
18. Gailey v. Robertson, 98 Fla. 176, 179, 123 So. 692, 693 (1929). Cf. German
Savings & Loan Soc. v. Ramish, 138 Cal. 12o, 125, 69 Pac. 89, 92 (19o2).
1g. The dissenting opinion in the instant case cites: Barnitz v. Beverly, 163 U. S.
118 (1896), cited note 7 supra (redemption period on mortgage); Crowther v. Fidelity
Ins. Trust & Safe Deposit Co., 85 Fed. 41 (C. C. A. 4th, 1898), cited note 6 supra (.min-
ing supplies' lien) ; National Bank of Commerce v. Jones, 18 Okla. 555, 91 Pac. 191
(1907), cited note 6 supra (agister's lien) ; Scranton Lackawanna Trust Co. v. Scran-
ton Lackawanna Trust Co., Guardian, 310 Pa. 125, i65 At. 42 (I933), which is based
solely, as regards this question, on Brine v. Ins. Co., 96 U. S. 627, 637 (1877) (redemp-
tion period on mortgage).
2o. This distinction is not made in the criticism of State v. Wynne, 134 Tex. 455,
135 S. W. (2d) 951 (939), (194o) 53 HARv. L. Ry. 889, 89o.
21. Where the retroactive legislation was in the nature of a change in the mode
of enforcing collection of a tax already existent (Provident Institution for Savings v.
Jersey City, 113 U. S. 5o6 (1885) ; Haskel v. City of Burlington, 30 Iowa 232 (1870))
the courts are especially emphatic in upholding the statute.
22. In this respect the instant statute did not go as far as similar statutes of other
states which provide for such divestiture immediately upon the "regular" tax sale. 4
TIFFANY, REL PROpmnT" (3d ed. z939) § 1248.
23. See State v. Kelleher, 195 U. S. 351, 360 (19o4).
24. "From such a construction it would result that a tax levied and delinquent
under a law making no adequate provision for its collection could never be enforced."
Haskel v. City of Burlington, 30 Iowa 232, 238 (1870).
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John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company of Boston, Massachusetts,
338 Pa. 426, 13 A. (2d) 34 (1940).
Plaintiffs in identical situations have at times recovered under the
theory that silence constituted acceptance of the offer,1 a theory now in total
disrepute 2 As to liability in tort for negligence,8 the courts are divided
with the modem majority denying recovery.4 It is fundamental that there
can be no negligence without the breach of a duty,5 and the existence or
non-existence of a duty on the part of insurers to treat applications promptly
is the focal point of the issue. Whether the duty is owed to the adminis-
trator or to the beneficiary, in the case of life insurance, is a collateral issue
on which the older majority was not unanimous. 6 Of persuasive value
impelling the creation of the duty are the custom of dating the schedule of
premium payments from the day of application rather than the day of
acceptance, the confidential nature of the dealings, the natural deferment of
negotiations with other insurers pending the outcome of the application,7
the fact that the insurance company would otherwise benefit by its own
carelessness, and the nature of insurance as a business affected with a public
interest in the face of the social desirability of obtaining the means of
immediate coverage. In opposition is the reluctance of the judiciary to
alter current demarcations of the areas of duty,8 and opinions often consign
the malady to the legislature for remedial treatment. 9 However, the entire
law of duty as well as the larger entity, the law of negligence, is a common-
law development 'o and capable of common-law growth. The common law
need scarcely look to the legislature when alteration or expansion of its own
creature is demanded. To be distinguished from the power to create the
duty is the advisability of creating the duty, but an inspection of the cases
I. Cases are collected in 32 C. J. ixo6, note 32. Notes (192i) 15 A. L. R. 1O26,0I931) 75 A. L. R. 952.
2. See RESTATEMENT, CONrACTS (1932) § 72; Funk, The Duty of an Insurer to
Act Promptly on Applications (927) 75 U. OF PA. L. REV. 207, 208, 223; Note (i93o)
4o YALE L. J. 121, 122.
3. Calvin, Is an Insurance Company Liable in Tort? (1930) 2 Miss. L. J. 293;
Funk, The Duty of an Insurer to Act Promptly on Applications (1927) 75 U. OF PA.
L. REV. 2o7; Parkhill, The Effect of Delay in Acting Upon an Application for Insur-
ance (1934) 7 FLA. ST. B. A. J. 219; Stovall, Tort Liability of Insurance Companies
(931) 3 Miss. L. J. 178; Notes (193i) ii B. U. L. Rv. 23o, (1938) 23 MARQ. L.
REv. 28, (1934) 32 Mic. L. REV. 395, (934) 6 Rocicy MT. L. REV. 224, (1935) W.
VA. L. Q. 417, (1935) io Wis. L. REV. 289, (1930) 40 YALE L. J. 121; (1935) 23
CALITF. L. REV. 215, (1934) 20 IOWA L. Rv. 165, (1935) 33 Mica. L. REv. 8o7, (1935)
ig MiNN. L. REv. 247, (937) 2 Mo. L. REv. io6.
4. Complete lists of cases pro and con may be found in two footnotes which form
part of the opinion in the Zayc case. Not included in this list is Bekken v. Equitable
Life Assurance Society of the United States, 293 N. W. 200 (N. D. Sup. Ct. 194o),
decided for the applicant.
5. Palsgraf v. Long Island R. R. Co., 248 N. Y. 339, 162 N. E. 99 (1928).
6. Bradley v. Federal Life Ins. Co., 295 Ill. 38r, 127 N. E. I91 (i92o) ; Bekken v.
Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States, 293 N. W. 2oo (N. D. Sup. Ct.
194o) ; cf. In re Coughlin's Estate, 53 N. D. 188, 2o5 N. W. 14 (1925) ; see Funk, loc.
cit. supra at 219; Note (1934) 32 MICH. L. REV. 395.
7- The applicant in the instant case was so approached.
8. Cf. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N. Y. i7o, 174 N. E. 44I (i931) ; Glanzer
v. Shepard, 233 N. Y. 236, 135 N. E. 275 (i922) ; MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217
N. Y. 282, 111 N. E. 1050 (I916).
9. There are a few statutes controlling this point. North Dakota, has a statutory
limit of twenty-four hours in which to act on applications for hail insurance. C. L.
1913, § 4902. Its constitutionality was upheld in National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Wan-
berg, 260 U. S. 71 (1922).
1o. See I STREaT, THE FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY (i9o6) pp. 91-95, 182-
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reveals, significantly enough, that almost all courts who have reached the
second step have decided for the applicant.',
Taxation-Collection of Use Tax from out of State Vendor-
Sears, Roebuck & Company, a foreign corporation, maintained retail estab-
ments in Iowa in addition to carrying on an extensive mail order business
therein from out of state stores. Iowa under its use tax statute' revoked
the corporation's retail license for failure to collect the tax on extrastate
mail order sales to Iowa consumers. Held (four judges dissenting), the
statute represented an unconstitutional 2 assumption by Iowa of control
over activities beyond its jurisdiction. Sears, Roebuck & Company v.
RoddeWig, 292 N. W. 130 (Iowa I94O).
The right of a state to tax intrastate use of goods of extrastate origin
as a corhplement to its domestic sales tax is unquestionable ;3 and the courts
have permitted the states to effectuate 4 the tax and overcome its inherent
administrative difficulties 5 by the enforcement of rather drastic collection
provisions. Accordingly, as a valid exercise of police power, a state may
require domestic retailers to collect the tax at the time of sale to the ultimate
consumer.8 Further, a foreign corporation doing both interstate and intra-
state business must comply with the state's demand that it collect the tax
as to both types of sale, and its privilege of doing intrastate business may be
conditioned on such compliance.7 The collection duty has more recently
been held to apply to a retailer wholly engaged in interstate business and
employing soliciting agents within the state, as to sales consummated outside
ii. A typical example is Kukuska v. Home Mut. Ins. Co., 204 Wis. i66, 172, 235
N. W. 403, 405 (931). The court, in holding the insurer liable, reviewed the technical
arguments and concluded that the exact nature of the duty was "not vitally important.
Each view finds some support in the cases . . . the consequent liability to respond
in damages is the same in each case."
x. "Every retailer maintaining a place of business in this state and making sales
of tangible personal property for use in this state . ., shall at the time of making
such sale, whether within or without the state, collect the tax. . . :" IowA CODE
(i939) § 6943.109. See id. §§ 6943.112, 6943.122, 6943.io4. Similar statutes are in force
in 17 states. C. C. H. State Tax Serv. 3301-3336 (194o).
2. The statute was attacked under the commerce clause U. S. CONsT. Art. 1, § 8, 3;
and under the due process clause U. S. CoNsT. AMEND. XIV, § i.
3. The Court's enthusiasm for the device has resulted in the modification or ex-
tinguishment of most of the commerce clause restrictions applicable thereto. Compare
Baldwin v. Seelig, 294 U. S. 5H1, 521, 522 (1935) with Henneford v. Silas Mason Co.,
300 U. S. 577 (1937), 51 HAxv. L. REv. I3. That such statutes are frankly intended
to reach interstate commerce, see Silas Mason Co. v. Henneford, 15 F. Supp. 958,,959
(E. D. Wash. 1933) (Wash. Tax Commission Report), does not void them unless
actual discrimination is shown. Gregg Dyeing Co. v. Query, 286 U. S. 472, 479 (I932),
Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., supra. But see Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing Dis-
trict, 120 U. S. 489, 497 (1887). Nor does the possibility of double taxation seem
fatal. Compare Henneford v. Silas Mason, supra at 587, with Gwinn White and Prince
v. Henneford, 305 U. S. 434, 439, 440 (1939). The Court will no longer hear the
argument that the tax is a levy on interstate commerce in all but name. J. Bacon and
Sons v. Martin, 305 U. S. 38o (1939).
4. Lowndes, State Taxation of Interstate Sales (935) 7 Miss. L. J. 223; Per-
kins, The Sales Tax and Transactions in Interstate Commerce (1933) 12 N. C. L.
REv. 99.
5. Collection of the tax from numberless petty purchasers would be prohibitive in
cost if not impossible. See Legis. (1939) 16 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 63o, 636. Items re-
quiring state licenses which could be withheld until payment of the use tax could, how-
ever, be controlled.
6. Felt and Tarrant Mfg. Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U. S. 62 (1938), (1939) 52 H.v.
L. REv. 835; Monamotor Oil Co. v. Johnson, 292 U. S. 86 (1934), Legis. (936) 9 So.
CAL. L. REv. 259. Cf. Natural Gas Co. v. Slattery, 3o2 U. S. 300 (1937) (exercise of
state police power at expense of interstate corporation).
7. Monamotor Oil Co. v. Johnson, 292 U. S. 86 ('934), cited note 6 supra.
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the state." The court in the instant case declared that, in contradistinction
to the situation in the aforementioned cases,' Sears-Roebuck's mail order
sales did not "pertain to" its activities within the state.,' Hence it was
maintained that such sales were beyond Iowa's jurisdiction, and that the
statutory provisions requiring collection of the tax at the time of sale con-
stituted state regulation of a transaction beyond its jurisdiction amounting
to a violation of due process." In view of the increasing recognition of the"undue immunities of many citizens from their obligations to support their
governments" 12 and the shift of emphasis in the court decisions from tax
burdens to tax immunities, this result is somewhat unexpected. There
should be no question of the state's jurisdiction over the transaction taxed,
the intrastate use of the article;" nor can difficulty be found in serving
valid process against the company so long as it has agents within the state
in connection with its retail stores.-' These conditions being satisfied,
unless the collection requirements involve an unreasonable or arbitrary
burden on the vendor, there would seem to be no sound authority for hold-
ing due process to have been violated.15 Here, had the statute been allowed,
the company would have suffered but equal burden with the other retailers
within the state. By continuing its immunity the Iowa court in effect sub-
jects other retailers within the state to continued discrimination in its
favor.
6
8. Felt and Tarrant Mfg. Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U. S. 6z (1938), cited note 6 supra.
9. The distinction between sales solicited through the mails and those solicited by
local collection agents, see Felt and Tarrant Mfg. Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U. S. 62 (1938),
not subject to state control, see Anderson Bros. v. Sioux Monument Co., 21o Iowa
1226, 1231, 232 N. W. 689 (193o); Real Silk Hosiery Mills v. Portland, 268 U. S. 325
(1925) ; Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District, 120 U. S. 489 (1887), would seem
rather tenuous. Yet in Felt and Tarrant Mfg. Co. v. Gallagher, supra, the due process
argument was dismissed without discussion.
io. Possibly meaning that no integral part of the sale was negotiated within the
state. See Lowndes, note 4 supra at 223. Compare the tendency of this court to con-
sider the tax as only nominally on the use with the attitude of the Supreme Court, note
3 supra.
ii. The court relies largely on partially analogous insurance cases to establish the
point that a state may not regulate activities beyond its jurisdiction, see Compania Gen-
eral de Tabacos v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 275 U. S. 78 (927) (tax on sale);
St. Louis Cotton Compress Co. v. Arkansas, 26o U. S. 346 (1922) (discrimination);
New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 246 U. S. 357 (igi8) (freedom of contract). But
cf. Osborn v. Ozlin, 30 U. S. 53 (i94o) ; Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Pa., 238
U. S. 143 (i915). See Lowndes, note 3 supra at 227. The commerce clause limitation
was not stressed by the court.
12. Traynor, Tax Decisions of the Supreme Court (1938), (I939) PRoc. 32D NAT.
CoxF. NAT. TAx Ass'Nw 27.
13. See note 3 supra.
14. Doherty v. Goodman, 294 U. S. 623 (1935) ; International Harvester Co. v.
Ky., 234 U. S. 579 (1914).
15. See note ii supra. Marshall, The Seller's Obligation to Collect the Use Tax
(939) PROC. 32D NAT. CONF. NAT. TAX Ass'N 245.
16. But see to the contrary, Buehler, Some Economic Problems of Use Taxes
(1939) PROC. 32D NAT. CONF. NAT. TAx Ass'N 237. Possibility of discrimination in
favor of other mail order houses not conducting intrastate businesses should be noted;
under present interpretations of the law, it would seem impossible to reach such, or
any ordinary extrastate vendor shipping into the state, for lack of jurisdiction. The
objection however is more apparent than actual. See Jenner, The Use Tax int Washing-
ton (1939) PROC. 32D NAT. CoNt. NAT. TAx Ass'N 262, 264. Across the counter sales
in neighboring states cannot be reached by the use tax for administrative reasons, re-
gardless of the jurisdictional question. Montgomery Ward v. Roddewig, 292 N. W. 142
(Iowa i94o). In view of the manifold and manifest difficulties involved in judicial
control, perhaps the most acceptable solution for the whole problem of interstate taxa-
tion would be some form of planned national administration by Congress. See Mr.
Justice Black, dissenting, in Gwinn White and Prince v. Henneford, 305 U. S. 434
(1939) ; see Justices Black, Frankfurter and Douglas, dissenting, in McCarrol v. Dixie
Greyhound Lines, 309 U. S. 176, I88, 189 (194o). See Buehler, supra at 24o.
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Taxation-Deduction of Interest on an Indebdtedness Arising
from Husband-Wife Transaction, under Section 23 (b) of the Rev-'
enue Acts-Husband, without valuable consideration, sealed and
delivered to his wife a $15o,ooo demand note bearing 6 per cent. interest
and secured by valuable collateral, the transaction occurring in Pennsyl-
vania. Husband paid wife 6 per cent. annually and in computing his income
tax he deducted these payments as interest on indebtedness under Section
23 (b) of the 1932 and 1934 Revenue Acts.' These deductions were dis-
allowed by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. Held (one judge dis-
senting), the deductions are allowable and the husband-wife relationship
shall not in itself be sufficient to stamp a transaction a mere tax avoidance
device, especially where there is evidence of good faith furnished by the
delivery of valuable collateral. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Park,
113 F.. (2d) 352 (C. C. A. 3rd, 194o).
While it is true in Pennsylvania that the delivery of a sealed note as
a gift without consideration creates a binding obligation 2 which may be
considered an indebtedness,8 and that money paid creditors for forbearing
to demand payment may be called interest,4 it does not follow that these
payments may be deducted under Section 23 (b). The promise to pay the
interest, given at the same time as the promise to pay the principal, was a.
part of the gift and the fact that it was under seal only makes it legally
enforceable, and cannot be said to destroy its character as a gift.5 Each
time the husband made an interest payment he was simply delivering an-
other portion of the gift he had promised to make. The opinion of the
majority, failing to consider that an enforceable obligation might also be a
gift and that as such it should be subject to the limitations on gift deductions
under Section 23 (O), stated that since the parties intended to be bound
by the transaction the deduction should be allowed. 7 But it was obviously
not the intent of Congress in drafting 23 (b) to allow the unlimited deduc-
tion of gifts in the form of interest when under Section 23 (o), in providing
for the deduction of gifts, they allowed deductions only in a very limited
number of situations.8 Thus it is to be noted that if this decision is allowed
to stand it will place the court's approval on a very simple method of tax
reduction in direct contradiction to the apparent intent of Congress in
framing Section 23 (0).
Taxation-Taxability of Insurance Proceeds where Decedent was
not Insurable-Decedent, aged 75, entered at the same time into two
contracts with insurance company, one a single premium life insurance
i. Revenue Act of 1932, § 23 (b) ; Revenue Act of 1934, § 23 (b).
2. Balliet v. Fetter, 314 Pa. 284, 288, iM' AtI. 466, 468 (1934). In speaking of the
validity of a sealed note given as a gift without consideration the court stated, "As
early as Yard v. Patton, 13 Pa. 278, it was definitely settled that the presence of a seal
was not merely presumptive evidence of consideration but actually imports a considera-
tion, and a host of cases extending down to Killeens Estate, 31o Pa. 182, have followed
this rule."
3. "The term indebtedness as used in the Revenue Act implies an unconditional
obligation to pay." Gilman v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 53 F. (2d) 47, 50
(C. C. A. 8th, 193); accord, Lenox Realty Co. v. Hackell, 122 Conn. 143, 146, 187
Atl. 895, 896 (1936).
4. "In the business world 'interest on indebtedness' means compensation for the use
or forbearance of money." Deputy v. DuPont, 308 U. S. 488, 498 (194o) ; accord,
Bettendorf v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 3 B. T. A. 378, 383 (926).
5. Accord, Longyear v. Helvering, 77 F. (2d) 1i6 (App. D. C. 1935).
6. Revenue Act of 1934, § 23 (O).
7. Chisholm v. Commnissioner of Internal Revenue, 79 F. (2d) 'x6 (C. C. A. 2d,
1935).
8. See note 6 supra.
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and the other a single premium life annuity; the former was issued without
medical examination of decedent and solely because of her purchase of the
latter.' The Commissioner of Internal Revenue appealed from a decision of
the B. T. A.2 ruling that these were tax-exempt proceeds within the mean-
ing of the Act.3  Held, Reversed. Proceeds were properly taxed because
not receivable as insurance but rather as the proceeds of a "loan transac-
tion". Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Keller's Estate, 113 F. (2d)
833 (C. C. A. 3d, 194o).
This device for tax avoidance 4 originated as a single contract combin-
ing the features of an annuity and life insurance.5  It was held that such
contract was in the nature of an investment and the Old Colony case denied
the proceeds exemption.6 But whenever the decedent was, as in the prin-
cipal case, ingenious enough to enter into two separate standard contracts 7
a majority of the Board of Tax Appeals has consistently held that the pro-
ceeds were tax exempt. 8 This was affirmed in one instance by the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit, on the grounds that the two contracts
were separable and that one of them was a life insurance. 9 The court, in
I. Estate of Anna M. Keller, 39 B. T. A. 1O47, 1o5o (1939); Commissioner of
Internal Revenue v. Keller's Estate, 113 F. (2d) 833, 835 (C. C. A. 3d, 1940).
2. Estate of Anna M. Keller, 39 B. T. A. 1O47 (1939) (5 members of the Board
dissenting).
3. REVENUE Acr OF 1926 § 302 (g); INT. REV. CODE § 811 (g) (1939): "The
value of the gross estate shall be determined by including the value at the time of his
death of all property. . . " (g) "To the extent of the amount receivable by the
executor . . .; and to the extent of the excess over $4o,ooo of the amount receivable
by all other beneficiaries as insurance (italics supplied) under policies taken out by the
decedent upon his own life."
4. PAUL, STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAXATION (Ist series 1937) 25, 41; Paul, Life In-
surance and the Federal Estate Tax (1939) 52 HAxv. L. REv. 1037, 1O74; see (194o)
49 YALE L. J. 946; the latter writer, while emphasizing the implications of such devices
in other tax connections, summarily dismisses them in connection with the estate tax
on the ground that ". . . persons with sufficient resources to afford paid-up policies
would normally be able to purchase additional insurance of the exempt type". This is
questionable; such persons could get no exempt life insurance (except, possibly,
through group insurance) since policies are issued to them only when they also pur-
chase an annuity. Estate of Anna M. Keller, 39 B. T. A. 1O47, 1050 (939).
5. By such a contract the insurance company agreed in return for a single lump
sum payment to pay a life annuity to the "insured" and upon his death, the amount of
the original premium (loading charges not included) to his named beneficiary. Old
Colony Trust Co. v. Comm'r, lO2 F. (2d) 380, 381 (1939).
6. Old Colony Trust Co. v. Comm'r, io2 F. (2d) 380 (C. C. A. ist, 1939), aff'g,
37 B. T. A. 435 (1938), (1939) 52 HARV. L. REV. ii8o, Note (1940) 38 MicH. L. REv.
526; Chemical Bank & Trust Co., 37 B. T. A. 535 (1938) ; Estate of Roxy M. Smith,
16 B. T. A. 314 (1929) ; State ex rel Thornton v. Probate Court, 186 Minn. 351, 243
N. W. 389 (1932); see Note (1937) 32 ILL. L. RV. 223, 232. Even though the con-
sideration for such contract had been actuarially divided into a life insurance single
premium and a life annuity single premium. See Bowman v. Tax Comm., 135 Ohio St.
295, 20 N. E. (2d) 916, 917 (1939) ; Ballou v. Fisher, 154 Ore. 548, 61 P. (2d) 423
(1936).
7. Including the usual provisions concerning changes of beneficiary, changes in
mode of settlement or amount of insurance, options for settlement, dividends, loans, cash
surrender values, etc. Estate of Anna M. Keller, 39 B. T. A. 1O47, 1048 (1939).
8. Estate of Anna H. Clise, 41 B. T. A. No. iog, April II, 194o; Estate of Walter
L. Fisher, B. T. A. memo. op. 3 Prentice-Hall 194o Fed. Tax Serv. 23,318-A (1939) ;
Estate of Edyth LeGierse, 39 B. T. A. 1134 (1939); Estate of Herbert F. Tyler, B. T.
A. memo. op. 3 Prentice-Hall 194o Fed. Tax Serv. 123,318-A (1939) ; Estate of Anna
M. Keller, 39 B. T. A. 1047 (1939).
9. Comm'r v. LeGierse, Iio F. (2d) 734 (C. C. A. 2d, 194o), aff'g, Estate of Edyth
LeGierse, 39 B. T. A. 1134 (1939). While conceding that the entire transaction was
to be considered the court took a legalistically formal view of the contracts and em-
phasized that they were independent and could have been assigned or surrendered sepa-
rately and that, no matter what she had to buy before getting it, what the decedent got
was still insurance upon her life.
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the principal case, properly held that, in view of the decedent's uninsur-
ability, the life insurance had to, be examined in connection with the
annuity,10 and that the transaction thus appeared to be a mere loan,11 a
taxable transfer.12 Both courts seem to be agreed that the decision in the
Old Colony case is in accord with a sound policy.'3 Their difference arises
in deciding to which, if to any, combinations of two separate contracts it
should apply. While the former denies that the two contracts are merely a
policy of the "Old Colony" type in disguise, the instant court, in its actuarial
enthusiasm, over-emphasizes the compensation of the life insurance "risk"
by the annuity contract." Where decedent was insurable,15 the insurance
contract is truly independent and its proceeds should be held to be receivable
as insurance, irrespective of the existence of a separate annuity "I and its
possible compensatory effect." "The paradox consists in applying a life
insurance exemption to the estate of an uninsurable prospect." Is
io. As to the compensatory effect of the annuity on the life insurance risk see
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Keller's Estate, 113 F. (2d) 833 (C. C. A. 3d,
i94o) and footnotes and Appendix to the opinion; Helvering v. Tyler, ii F. (2d) 422
(C. C. A. 8th, 1940); Old Colony Trust Co. v. Comm'r, 1o2 F. (2d) 380 (C. C. A.
Ist, 1939), 52 HA~v. L. REv. ii8o; Estate of Anna M. Keller, 39 B. T. A. 1047 (1939),
(i94o) 49 YALE L. J. 946; Note (1940) 40 CoL. L. Rv. 86,.87. It should be noted
that there is no exact compensation of the insurance risk except when the amounts are
calculated for a same life expectancy at the same rate of interest and with the same
mortality table.
ii. Repayable at the death of the lender and the interest of which took the form
of a life annuity. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Keller's Estate, 113 F. (2d)
833, 835 (C. C. A. 3d, 1940).
12. INT. Rav. CODE § 8ii (c) (I939). The court refused to decide under which
section the transfer should be taxed but another court held that it was a "transfer of
property intended to take effect after death". Helvering v. Tyler, III F. (2d) 422, 426
(C. C. A. 8th, 1940). As to the difficulty of interpretation of § 302, PAUl, op. cit.
supra note 4; Note (i934) 82 U. OF PA. L. REV. 384.
13. The Old Colony case was followed in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v.
Keller's Estate, 113 F. (2d) 833, 836 (C. C. A. 3d, 1940), and in Helvering v. Tyler,
In F. (2d) 422 (C. C. A. 8th, 194o). While attempting to distinguish it on its facts
from and refusing to apply it to the case at hand, the court in the LeGierse case ex-
pressed no adverse criticism of the decision. Comm'r v. LeGierse, iio F. (2d) 734, 735
(C. C. A. 2d, i94o).
14. Its decision appears to hinge upon the very existence of a life annuity and its
destructive effect upon the life insurance risk and could be taken to imply that Congress
meant to prevent indirectly bona fide insurance policy holders from purchasing an
annuity with another or the same insurance company.
15. Whether the decedent was an insurable prospect would clearly depend on such
factors as his age and life expectancy, his health and the requirement of a physical ex-
amination. The fact that no policy could have been issued unless the decedent had
purchased an annuity should, of itself, be decisive as indicating uninsurability.
16. There would be an insurance risk within the contract itself. This would satisfy
the essential requirement stressed in the instant case. VANCr, INSURANCE (2d ed.
1930) §§ 3, 23 and see Note (x936) 36 COL. L. REv. 456. It should then be immaterial
that the risk is totally or partially destroyed by the existence of a truly separate con-
tract of annuity.
17. Another of these cases will soon come up before another circuit court of ap-
peals. Estate of Walter L. Fisher, B. T. A. memo. op., 3 Prentice-Hall 194o Fed. Tax
Serv. 23,318-A (on appeal to C. C. A. 7th). It is to be hoped that the breach be-
tween the Tyler and Keller cases on the one hand and the LeGierse case on the other
will not be further widened, but rather that they will be reconciled by an opinion fol-
lowing the decision of the former while refusing to deny the validity of the reasoning of
the latter in cases where the decedent was insurable and could have gotten insurance
without purchasing an annuity.
I8. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Keller's Estate, 113 F. (2d) 833, 834
(C. C. A. 3d, I94o).
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Trade Regulation-State's Power to Prohibit Below Cost Sales-
Defendant was indicted for violation of the Fair Sales Act I prohibiting the
"advertisement, offer for sale, or sale" of goods below cost. Held, for
defendant. The statute is too arbitrary an exercise of the police power and
a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Commonwealth v. Zasloff, 13 A.
(2d) 67 (Pa. 1940).
Although several jurisdictions have held their Fair Sales Acts 2 uncon-
stitutional," state regulation of industry is an accepted fact.4 Aiming pri-
marily at the elimination of "loss-leaders", 5 the Pennsylvania statute pro-
hibits all below cost sales regardless of their effect or purpose,6 whereas
most of the statutes forbid this practice only when intended to injure com-
petitors or destroy competition. 7  However, such an intent clause, being
I. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1939) tit. 73, §§ 2oi-2o7. For general discussions
see GaR=E, PRICE CONTROL UNDER FAmr TRADE LnisLAnrIox (Ist ed. 1939); Oler,
Statutory Prohibitions Against Sales Below Cost (1939) 43 Dicm. L. REv. 112; Wood,
The Constitutionality as Police Power Measures, of Recent Pennsylvania Statutes
Regulating Unfair Competition, id. at 127; Note (1938) 32 ILL. L. REv. 816.
2. These acts are also known as Unfair Practices Acts and have been enacted in
Ariz., Ark., Calif., Col., Conn., Idaho, Ky., La., Me., Md., Mass., Mich., Minn., Mont.,
Neb., N. J., Okla. (advertising space only), Ore., Pa., R. I., S. C., Tenn., Utah, Va.,
Wash., W. Va., Wisc., Wyo. These statutes have been collected in io6 C. C. H. 1938
Trade Reg. Serv., indexed at p. goo2 and in GRrnR, op. cit. supra note I, Appendix
A at 403.
3. The NEw JERsEy FAIR SALES Acr, N. J. Laws 1938, c. 394, almost identical
with that of Pa., was held unconstitutional in Lied v. Packard-Bamberger & Co., 123
N. J. L. i8o, 8 A. (2d) 291 (939), (1939) 88 U. OF PA. L. REv. 222. The Maryland
Act, similar to that of California, was held unconstitutional in Daniel Loughran Co.,
Inc. v. Lord Baltimore Candy & Tobacco Co., Inc., 12 A. (2d) 201 (Md. C. of A.
i94O), because of the vagueness of the cost sections. Meanwhile, the California Act
has been held constitutional in Wholesale Tobacco Dealers' Bur of S. Calif., Inc. v.
Nat'!l Candy & Tobacco Co., ii Cal. (2d) 634, 82 P. (2d) 3 (1938), although no case
has tested the cost determining sections. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court feels that
the cost sections in the instant act are also too vague but "if the Act confined itself to
prohibiting sales below cost when intended to destroy competition, it would undoubt-
edly be valid." (Instant case at 7o.)
It is interesting to note that Commonwealth v. Zasloff, 137 Pa. Super. 96, 8 A. (2d)
8oi (1939), (194o) 6 U. Or PiTT. L. Ryv. g6, is cited to support the unconstitutionality
of the Maryland Act in Loughran v. Baltimore, supra at 207, while the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court, as noted above, intimates that a statute such as Maryland's is consti-
tutional.
Both the Michigan Act, in Frens v. Foster, xo5 C. C. H. 194o Trade Reg. Serv.
f2518 (Mich. C. C. for Ingham City, i939), and the Nebraska Act, in State ex rel.
English v. Ruback, 135 Neb. 335, 281 N. W. 607 (1938), have been held unconstitu-
tional for other reasons.
4. Nebbia v. N. Y., 291 U. S. 502, 537 (I934), Note (1934) 82 U. OF PA. L. REV.
619; Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram Distilling Co., 299 U. S. 183 (1936);
Sears-Roebuck & Co. v. Fed. Trade Comm., 258 Fed. 307 (C. C. A. 7th, i919) ; Great
A. & P. Tea Co. v. Ervin, Atty. Gen., 23 F. Supp. 7o (D. C. Minn. 1938). See Nebbia
v. N. Y., supra at 525: "The guarantee of due process, as has often been held, demands
only that the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious, and that the means
selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the object sought to be attained."
See also (1939) 88 U. oF PA. L. REV. 222, i. 3.
5. Loss leaders are defined in Calif. St. 1939, c. 175, § 3, as "... any article or
product sold at less than cost as herein defined to induce, proniote or encourage, the
purchase of other merchandise, or which may have the tendency or capacity to mislead
or deceive purchasers or prospective purchasers, or which diverts trade from or other-
wise injures competitors." For other definitions see G~r EH, op. cit. sufra note I, at
200-202.
6. See Commonwealth v. Liberty Prod. Co., 84 Pa. Super. 473, 478 (1925) : "Many
statutes which are in the nature of police regulations, as this is, impose criminal penal-
ties, irrespective of any intent to violate them. . ..
7. Ariz., Ark., Calif., Col., Conn., Idaho, Ky., Me., Md., Mass., Mich., Minn.,
Mont., S. C., Tenn., Utah, Va., Wyo., Okla. and Ore. require that the effect of the
sale be to injure competitors or destroy competition; La., Utah and Va. statutes require
either the intent or the effect. The last three also consider the fact that these sales are
bad because they induce the public to buy other goods at an exorbitant price.
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primarily designed to outlaw monopoly tactics, does not cover the loss
leader situation." With a sweeping prohibition of all below cost sales clear-
ing the ground, provisions are then made in the instant statute for those
sales which are harmless." While the court asserts that there are many
desirable situations prohibited by the Act, specific illustrations are hard to
find.10 Even if the statute does prohibit some sales that have no harmful
effect, a general prohibition of a general practice is not necessarily invalid
because a few innocent situations are affected.1  Difficulty arises out of the
fact that courts feel price cutting in itself is not an evil 1, and that statutes
like the instant one prohibit many legitimate sales practices in order to elim-
inate a few illegitimate ones. 13 Consequently, the failure on the part of the
legislature to mention policy in the body of the Act seems to be regarded by
the court as another fatal defect because, without an expression of policy,
the court has no intelligent basis for its interpretation. 4 However, the
advancement of fair trade practices is dearly shown by the Act's titles to
be its purpose and therefore it has been suggested that the court read into
the Act an intent or effect clause 15 or give a liberal interpretation to the
list of exceptions. The trend today is definitely away from free trade and
8. Special sections were enacted expressly to include the loss-leader situations in
Arizona (Ariz. Sess. 1937, c. ", § 83) and California (Calif. St. 1939, c. 175, § 3).
9. PA. STAT. ANx. (Purdon, 1939) tit. 73, § 205: "The provisions of the Act shall
not apply to sales at retail or sales at wholesale-(a) where merchandise is sold in
bona fide clearance sales, and is advertised, marked, and sold as such; (b) where perish-
able merchandise must be promptly sold in order to forestall loss; (c) where merchan-
dise is imperfect, or damaged, or is being discontinued, and is advertised, marked, and
sold as such; (d) where merchandise is sold upon the final liquidation of any business;
(e) where merchandise is sold for charitable purposes; (f) where the price of the
merchandise is made to meet the legal price of a competitor for merchandise of the
same grade, quality, and quantity; and (g) where merchandise is sold by any officer
acting under the direction of any court."
io. See Commonwealth v. Hodin, 34 D. & C. 270, 275 (Pa. 1938), in which the
same statute was involved. This court does give specific examples. Merchantable
coffee in marred or dirty containers could not be sold at less than cost unless "adver-
tised, marked, and sold as imperfect or damaged merchandise". A dealer of livestock
could not dispose of his herd at less than cost to save expense of winter feeding. An
automobile dealer with cars on hand at the end of the year could not sell them at less
than cost. Where an automobile dealer has one car of a particular make left and
wishes to take over an agency for another make, he could not sell this one car at less
than cost without marking it as discontinued. A used car dealer could not sell a car
he took as a trade-in or bought second-hand at less than cost "in-the regular course of
his business".
Of the five illustrations, the court admits the first and fourth can come under the
exceptions. A herd of livestock might readily be classified as perishable merchandise,
or the sale might come under the discontinuance exception. The third example can
fall under either the exception allowed for clearance sales or for discontinued merchan-
dise. The second-hand cars can be sold at clearance sales, as imperfect or damaged
goods, or as a sale made at a price to meet the legal price of a competitor, depending
on the actual circumstances. It is conceivable that any machinery, especially automo-
biles and other goods subject to depreciation, can be classified as perishable merchan-
dise.
ii. See Semler v. Ore. St. Bd of Dental Exam., 294 U. S. 6o8, 613 (I935) ; Pierce
Oil Corp. v. City of Hope, 248 U. S. 498, 5oo (i919) ; People v. Elerding, 254 Ill. 579,
587, 98 N. E. 982, 986 (19o).
12. See instant case at 70: "Price cutting in itself is not an evil."
13. See Commonwealth v. Zasloff, 137 Pa. Super. 96, xoo, 8 A. (2d) goi, 8o3
(1939).
14. See Commonwealth v. Zasloff, 86 Pitt. Leg. 3. 597, 598 (1938).
15. See Oler, loc. cit. supra note i, at 118: ".. . into the Pennsylvania statute
might be read an element of scienter, intent, or purpose-a suggestion apparently al-
ready rejected on the ground that a criminal statute will be strictly construed in accord-
ance with its terms. . . :" And see ibid., n. 35: "Query: should" the rule of strict
interpretation operate to preclude an interpretation that would make the Common-
wealth's task of proof more difficult?"
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toward fair trade and with similar statutes being enacted throughout the
country, the instant statute might well have been found constitutional.
Trusts-Time Within Which Trustees Must Convert Non-
legal Securities Into Legals-Trustee was given non-legal securities
as part of a trust res in 1931. Anticipating a rising market, he retained
these securities for eight years before selling them. Beneficiary requested
that the trustee be surcharged by the amount such stock fell in value after
the first year, because of his failure to convert by the end of that time.
Trustee claimed he did all that was necessary, exercised due care and
prudence in determining when to convert. The court, upon rehearing,
reversed its prior ruling,' and held, (two judges dissenting) for trustee,
no arbitrary period for the conversion could be set, and due care had been
maintained. Casani's Estate, Phila. Legal Intelligencer, Aug. 6, 194o, p. I,
col. 3 (0. C. Phila., Pa. 194o).
Acknowledging that trustees have a duty to convert nonlegal invest-
ments, which they receive as part of a trust res, into legal investments, 2 the
courts have nevertheless differed as to the time limit imposed upon the
exercise of that duty. The majority opinion leans heavily upon recent
Pennsylvania precedent 3 in support of their argument that to change from
the "common prudence" rule in the case of trustees would be a shift of a
hundred year old law.4 Seemingly ignored is the fact that in Seantans'
Estate 5 the broad generalizations so prevalent in this field were definitely
limited,' and a presumptive period of one year established. This rule, since
i. The prior decision was written by J. Stearne in reliance on Seamans' Estate,
333 Pa. 358, 5 A. (2d) 2o8 (1939). It held that a presumptive period of one year did
exist, and surcharged the trustee. Casani's Estate, 37 D. & C. 182 (0. C. Phila., Pa.
1940). The court then, on its motion, ordered a rehearing.
2. Notes (1939) 122 A. L. R. 8oi, (1925) 37 A. L. R. 559.
3. Clabby's Estate, 338 Pa. 305, 12 A. (2d) 71 (1940) ; Shipley's Estate (No. i),
337 Pa. 571, 12 A. (2d) 343 (1940). Acquiescence of beneficiaries together with the
rule of "common prudence" were discussed in both cases. The majority in the instant
case felt that these were alternative grounds for the decision and therefore that the
language in these two recent cases overruled prior Supreme Court decisions. See note
14 infra.
4. From Calhoun's Estate, 6 Watts 185 (Pa. 1837) to Nola's Estate, 333 Pa. io6,
3 A. (2d) 326 (1939). Neither case appears strongly in point. Calhoun's Estate ap-
pears clearly distinguishable on its facts, even though there is language to support this
proposition. The decision in Nola's Estate rests upon a mandatory order to convert at
a time stipulated by the testator, so this rule is merely dictum. See Nola's Estate, 333
Pa. io6, 109, 3 A. (2d) 326, 329 (1939).
5. 333 Pa. 358, 5 A. (2d) 208 (1939).
6. Typical of the generalizations is this quote from an earlier case: "A distinction
is taken in our books between cases where the administrator has money in his hands,
or property of the estate, and loans or sells it; and cases where a security comes into
his hands for collection. In the former case, a more rigid accountability is created;
because he parts with that which is already in his hands, and secure to the estate; and
ought, therefore, to look more clasely into the circumstances of those on whose credit
he parts with it. . . . [In the latter case he] is entitled to the benefit of this distinc-
tion. . . . He must do as a prudent man, under like circumstances, might do in his
own case." Keller's Appeal, 8 Pa. 288, 289 (1848). The same language continued
through Coogins' Appeal, 3 Walker 426 (Pa. i88o) ; Dauler's Estate, 247 Pa. 356, 93
Atl. 511 (1915) ; Borell's Estate, 256 Pa. 523, IOO Atl. 953 (917) until it was definitely
made to apply to trustees specifically in the leading case of Taylor's Estate, 277 Pa. 518,
121 Atl. 310 (1923). Then Taylor's Estate was cited with approval either as dictum
[Brown's Estate, 287 Pa. 499, 504, 135 At. 112, 113 (1926)], or in situations within
either rule because trustee was in fact negligent [Komara's Estate, 311 Pa. 135, 166 Ati.
577 (933) ; Kelch's Estate, 318 Pa. 296, 178 Atl. 129 (935) ; Reinhard's Estate, 322
Pa. 325, 185 Atl. 298 (2936)].
Recognizing this state of the law, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court said: "Not-
withstanding the broad tenor of some of the language thus quoted, . . . The law
imposes limitations upon 'ordinary prudence' in such cases in order to preserve the
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it makes allowance for failure to sell under exceptional circumstances, 7
merely shifts the burden of proof after the period of one year," and does not
force a sale at a huge loss.9 Since the trustee must also exercise due care
in administering investments he makes personally, the failure to impose this
additional requirement of immediate conversion of nonlegals, reduces to a
nullity the duty of conversion.10 In addition, sign posts have been created
in the form of legislative lists of Legal Investments '1 to prevent investments
by trustees in securities which are more subject to unusual and rapid depre-
ciation and loss, and in the absence of a declaration by the settlor granting
trustee permission to maintain these nonlegals, it is reasonable to assume
settlor desired trustees to invest in these statutory signposts, rather than to
keep the nonlegals . 2  In this conflict of when to impose "reasonable con-
duct or duty" on a trustee, this presumed intent of the settlor and that of
the legislature should be controlling, so that trustees may be prevented from
engaging in speculative activities,"s which often results from a substitution
of their judgment for that of the legislature's. Consequently, common skill
and care, although satisfactory in many fields, is no answer here; there is
need of, and the law does, impose a higher standard. 14
differentiation between non-legal and legal securities, and between fiduciaries and others
as to the right to speculate." Seamans' Estate, 333 Pa. 358, 362, 5 A. (2d) 2o8, 21f
(r939). Support was afforded the Court by Hughes v. Empson, 22 Beav. II, 52 Eng.
Rep. R. 1077 (Rolls Ct. i856), and RESTATEmENT, TRUSTS (935) §23o (b) quoted in
full in Seamans' Estate, 333 Pa. 358, 363, n. 2, 5 A. (2d) 208, 211, n. 2 (1939), and
requoted with approval in Casani's Estate, 37 D. & C. 182, x84 (0. C. Phila., Pa. 1940).
7. "Under certain circumstances a fiduciary is excused from the prompt sale of non-
legal securities which is otherwise required. Such circumstances cannot be completely
catalogued; they must be considered in each case as they arise. Among them may be
mentioned instances where the market is so restricted that it is reasonably impossible
to sell the security; or where the offering of a large block of stock at one time would
drastically break the market price; or where a security is abnormally depressed in
value because of a general economic and financial collapse, so that a sale can be effected
only at a sacrifice, but there is a reasonable likelihood of an early return to stable con-
ditions which will restore the normal value. A fiduciary is not compelled to jettison
seasoned investments during a temporary panic." Seamans' Estate, 333 Pa. 358, 364,
5 A. (2d) 2o8, 21I-2i (1939), quoted with approval in Casani's Estate, 37 D. & C.
i82, 184 (0. C. Phila., Pa. 1940).
8. No "change of rules was involved" after this trustee took over in 1931, because
the FIDUCIAR=IS Acr oF 1917 [20 PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 193o) § 866], which was
then controlling was stringent in requiring "reasonable diligence" to be exercised in the
conversion of non-legals into legals. Subsequent statutes [2o PA. STAT. ANN. (Pur-
don, Cum. Supp. 1939) § 8oi (ig) (c), and § 866] providing for the exercise of "due
care and prudence in the disposition or retention of any such non-legal investment".
and for the trustee's right to petition the court to retain or sell, have been less severe.
Of course all these phrases are subject to judicial interpretation, as to their exact mean-
ing. See Bolger, J., dissenting in the instant case.
9. See note 7 supra.
io. See dissenting opinion in instant case by Bolger, $.
11. For a list of authorized securities in Pennsylvania see 2o PA. STAT. ANN.
(Purdon, Cume. Supp. 1939) § 8or, discussed in Note (1936) 84 U. or PA. L. REv. 64o.
Additional information may be secured in a symposium on Investment of Trust Funds,
5 LAW & CoNTrn'. PROR. (1938) 335-376.
12. x PERRY, TRUSTS & TRUSTEE (7th ed. 1929) § 465.
13. "To do otherwise would encourage that which it has been the special policy of
the law to prevent, the employment of trust property in any other mode than is clearly
recognized." Lucht v. Behrens, 28 Ohio St. 231, 24o (1876). See also O'Brien's Es-
tate, 18 D. & C. 5o, 5o2 (0. C. Phila., Pa. 1933).
14. Seamans' Estate, 333 Pa. 358, 5 A. (2d) 208 (1939), as the minority opinion
in the instant case points out, was a carefully considered and detailed opinion in which
the court evaluated and limited prior decisions in imposing the one year presumptive
period. [See note 6 s=fra.] Since then only dictum has held contr4: Clabby's Estate,
338 Pa. 305, 12 A. (2d) 7r (1940) (The concurring opinion would have become a dis-
sent if the question of time to convert were other than dictum) ; Shipley's Estate (No.
r), 337 Pa. 57r, 12 A. (2d) 343 (194o). It is difficult to assume that the Pennsyl-
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Wills-Legacy to Creditor as Pro Tanto Satisfaction of Claim-
Claimant advised testatrix in her investments for over a period of six
years and was told that he would be compensated in her will. Testatrix
in a bequest, not specifying its purpose, left claimant $2,000 in a secured
note. Claimant alleged $1o,825 was due for services, and sued for that
amount. Held (one justice dissenting),' when there is an understanding
that compensation is to be by testamentary disposition, the value of the
legacy, unless otherwise stated shall be applied upon the reasonable value
of the services either in full value or pro tanto. 2 In re Cooke's Estate, 292
N. W. 96 (Minn. 194o).
The instant case falls within a specialized group of cases wherein there
has been an agreement, or at least a tacit understanding between the debtor
and creditor that payment is to be by some sort of testamentary disposition.
When the legacy is equal to or exceeding an existing debt it is deemed to
be in satisfaction, but almost since its inception this rule was regarded as a
poor one.3 Modem authority would reverse the presumption 4 of satisfac-
tion and require a clear intention to pay the debt.5 The older rule is deeply
rooted however and many courts still recognize it, 6 but even those courts
following it have laid down many exceptions.7  Where the debt is unliqui-
dated,8 where there is an instruction in the will for payment of debts,9 or
where the legacy is smaller than the debt,10 the presumption of satisfaction
is not raised." Since in all cases the efforts of the court should be to deter-
vania Supreme Court will overrule Seamand" decision decided so recently (1939) when
neither new reasons nor authorities can be presented.
Other states have long since recognized the value of this rule and have established
it: Matthews v. Sheehan, 76 Conn. 654, 57 Atl. 694 (19o4) ; Babbitt v. Fidelity Trust
Co., 72 N. J. Eq. 745, 66 At. 1076 (Ch. 19o7) ; others have used language importing
its existence: Mattocks v. Moulton, 84 Me. 545, 552, 24 At. Ioo4, ioo6 (1892); Ward
et al. v. Tinkham, 65 Mich. 695, 698-699 (1887) ; Warren et at. v. Union Bank et aL.,
157 N. Y. 259, 51 N. E. 1036 (1898) ; It re Morris, 153 Misc. 905, 907, 276 N. Y. Supp.
254, 258 (1934). Compare HILL, TausTEEs (4th ed. 1867) § 380 with id. at § 381.
i. The dissenting justice feels that there was no evidence of an understanding be-
tween the parties. Although it is not perfectly clear from his language it appears that
his decision would have been the same regardless. Instant case, at 9g.
2. The court held that a verdict in excess of the legacy to claimant would be ex-
cessive so this would seem to reduce the portion of the rule as to legacies less in value
than the debt owed, to the status of a dictum. Instant case, at 99.
3. 3 STORY, EQUITY JuRIs. (I4th ed. 1918) § isoo: ". . • it is deemed to have so
little of a solid foundation either in general reasoning or as a just interpretation of the
intention of the testator, that slight circumstances have been laid hold of to escape
from it and to create exceptions to it."
4. This is merely a rule of construction and the presumption which arises, yields
to the intention of the testator if otherwise ascertainable.
S. Dembinski's Estate, 316 Pa. 61, 63, 173 Atl. 314 (934) : "In order to consider
a legacy as payment of a debt the indication must be clear and certain." In re Card's
Estate, 26o N. Y. S. 764, 145 Misc. 686 (1932).
7. 3 STORY, op. cit. supra note 3; 2 PomEmoy, EQUITY JuRis. (4th ed.) § 527.
8. Allen v. Etter, 92 Ind. App. 297, 175 N. E. 286 (i3i); Williams v. Crary, 4
Wend. 443 (N. Y. 183o) ; Homer v. McGaughy, 62 Pa. i80 (1869).
9. Eaton v. Benton, 2 Hill 576 (N. Y. 1842) ; Coane's Estate, 310 Pa. 138, 165 At.
2 (1933).
io. Cloud v. Clinkinbeard, 8 B. Mon. 397 (Ky. 1848); Dembinski's Estate, cited
note 4 supra; Byrne v. Byrne, 3 S. & R. 54 (Pa. 1837).
ii. Other exceptions to be noted are: (a) Legacy and debt of a different nature.
Smith v. Marshall, i Root 159 (Conn. 379o) ; Strong v. Williams, 12 Mass. 391, 7
Am. Dec. 81; Bennett v. Piatt, 85 N. J. Eq. 436, 96 Atl. 482 (1915). (b) Indebted-
ness contracted at time after making will. Heisler v. Sharp, 44 N. J. Eq. 167, 14 Atl.
624 (1888) ; Hardeman's Estate, 8g Pa. Sup. Ct. 313 (1925). (c) Difference in time
of payment. Eaton v. Benton, 2 Hill 576 (N. Y. i8a2), cited note 8 supra; Baptist
Female University v. Borden, 132 N. C. 476, 44 S. E. 47 (19o3). (d) Legacies of
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mine the intention of the testator, it would seem that in the instant case,
although the legacy might have been brought within several of the excep-
tions, a just result was reached. When there is an understanding, as here,
and a legacy in favor of the creditor follows, it should shift the presumption
to one of payment rather than of a gift.12 It appears, however, as pointed
out in the concurring opinion,"' that the court did not apply the rule as a
rebuttable presumption but as an absolute rule of law, without considering,
perhaps, that the purpose of the court is to determine intention and not to
dictate it.
specific chattels. Cloud v. Clinkinbeard, 8 B. Mon. 397 (Ky. 1848) cited note 9 supra;
Strong v. Williams, supra. (e) Devise of land. Deichnan v. Arndt, 49 N. J. Eq. io6,
2 AtL 799 (i8gx) ; Eaton v. Benton, supra.
2, In re Mason's Will, 134 Misc. 902, 9,5, 236 N. Y. Supp. 72o, 736 (929);
Kujawski v. Sobelewski, 72 Pa. Sup. 326 (igi9) ; Hammond v. Smith, 33 Beav. 452, 55
Eng. Reprints 443 (Ch. 1864).
13. Instant case at 99.
